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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Charles Sanders Santiago Peirce, an original American thinker in
mathematics, physics, ethics, metaphysics, cosmology, religion and history, has often been ridiculed for awkward phrasing, abstruse vocabulary, and bewildering repetition.

Peirce, however, argued that each

word which he chose was the product of deliberate selection.

His

choice, he would have argued, underscored a methodical principle, a
plan concerned more with a systematic than a metaphysical approach.
"Habit" is one of Peirce's prime concepts; it is a term of deliberate selection and a concept of which modern educators should be
aware.
. The general goal of this thesis is to offer the proper apologia
for Peircean habit, an apologia which clearly defines the nature of
habit within Peirce's mature works and which formulates a proposition
on the value of habit for both those educators who have considered the
role of habit in education and those who have not.
Having briefly sketched Peirce's life and having reviewed the
literature on Peircean habit, I will clear the ground for an explication of "habit."

"Ground clearing" will define common terms and con-

cepts which Peirce charged with new meanings (meanings which manifestly
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departed from ordinary usage) and will define the peculiarly Peircean
vocabulary which bears upon the understanding of the single concept,
habit.
Since Peirce "failed" (chose not) to develop "habit" completely
in any one article or volume, I will consider all his collected published papers and concentrate on his more mature, thus more developed,
works.

I will restate the sense of the quoted text for clearness, and

then make appropriate explanations, expansions, and internal criticisms.
I will note sundry Peircean modifications, shortcomings, and characteristic features.
At conclusion, I will highlight the emphatic value and merit of
Peircean habit for modern education.

Within the conclusion, I will

comment briefly on the works of any education scholars who have
written extensively on Peirce's value to education.

3

THE LIFE OF PEIRCE
The founder of Pragmaticism, Charles Sanders Peirce, was the
second son of mathematician Benjamin Peirce.

Born on September 10,

1839, Charles was a student of both mathematics and physical science.
Although he graduated from Harvard at age 20, he hardly distinguished

-

himself as a scholar.
By encouragement and education, Peirce was a scientist.
desire, he was a philosopher.

By

Yet necessity dictated that Peirce work

for the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey which his father supervised.

He simultaneously furthered his scientific studies at both

Lawrence Scientific School and Harvard.

By the age of 24, he added an

M.A. degree and an Sc.B summa cum laude to his credits.
During his 30 years with the Survey, Charles published minor
articles on philosophy and logic and was appointed lecturer at Johns
Hopkins.

He remained at Johns Hopkins from 1879 to 1884.

His longer

and seemingly more labored works on logic vainly sought the light of
publication.

Photometric Research is Peirce's sole book published

during his lifetime.
Although he had not the benefit of publication, Peirce did have
the benefit of illustrious friends of no mean influence.

Benefactor

and fellow philosopher William James, philosopher Chaucey Wright, and
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes contributed considerably and actively to
the dialogue on pragmatism or "pragmaticism," Peirce's philosophical
creation.

4
With a small inheritance, Charles S. Peirce retired to Milford,
Pennsylvania in 1887.

He died in undeserved obscurity in 1914.

He was survived by his second wife, Juliette Froissy.

5

LITERATURE ON PEIRCEAN HABIT
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear," a paper originally written in
French, is considered by biographer philosopher Paul Weiss to be
Charles Peirce's first definite statement of the pragmatic principle.
Ironically, it is in this statement as in so many others that Peirce
argued

f~r

the precision of his language.

It is, however, Peirce's

very precision which, retrospectively, forbids appeal.

Charles S.

Peirce, a teacher without students, a philosopher flashing brilliant
amid obscure darkness, failed to realize that all too often he came
close to being lucid but not close enough.

He is a man of genius

who left a wealth of coded brilliance, a brilliance which many have
succeeded partially in decoding.
He died on April 19, 1914 leaving hundreds of unindexed, undated,
unpagiRated manuscripts which Harvard University purchased from
Juliette Froissy Peirce.

Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, in six

volumes, coedited the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce from
1931 to 1935.

Bibliographer Arthur W. Burks, in 1958, edited the

seventh and eighth volumes.

There are also a number of available

paper back collections on Peirce, The Transactions of The Charles S.
Peirce Society, and sundry articles.
However, excepting Gary Shapiro's work on habit which does not
mention the value of Peirce's concept of habit for education, there
is no single work to which a modern educator could turn for an

6

explication of habit.
habit.

There are adequate piecemeal treatments of

The authors of these >-Jorks have not failed to explain habit;

but, like Peirce, they sought to explain other things.
I am indebted to the follm-Jing:

Vincent G. Potter, S .J., who

capably resolved many inconsistencies in Peirce's system and who admirably interprets Peirce's logical, ethical, and esthetic systems;
Murray-G. Murphey who traced and delineated Peirce's philosophy and
was particularly lucid in explaining "cognition," "inquiry," and
"cosmology;" Francis E. Reilly, S.J. who underscored "habitn as a
permanent theme in Peirce and explained, so that even a novice like
myself could understand, Peirce's use of the scientific method;
Richard J. Bernstein who, in a single extraordinary essay, developed
a precise delineation of "Firstness," "Secondness," "Thirdness," and
Peircean self-control; Edward

c.

Moore and Richard S. Robin who

edited Studies In Th~ Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, a volume
without which my thesis would be considerably less.
My greatest debt, however, is to Gary Shapiro who has given a
rather important, if,at times, rather recondite, appraisal of the
general nature of habit, of personality as a cluster of habits, of
belief and its habitual connection, and of the relationships among
"rule," "sensation," "case," decisions to act and results.

Further-

more, Shapiro charts the interrelationships among logic and habit,
and physiology and habit.

In a reasonable manner Shapiro also de-

lineates the influences in Peirce's philosophical life.

CHAPTER II
PEIRCEAN VOCABULARY
Language is only the extreme form of expression ••• " wrote
Charles

S. Peirce.

sider~d ... as

He concluded that ''.,.life itself may be con-

Expression."
•••••••••

0

0

•

Peirce's concept of habit can best be explained if some vocabulary "ground clearing" takes place.

Charles S. Peirce wrote for

both the lay and technical readers. Rigorously selecting the right
word, Peirce often used technical terms and charged them with new
meaning.

When the word which he sought did not exist, he coined it.

His vocabulary is both common and extraordinary; and his concept of
habit is affected by his vocabulary.
It is my main intention to get at, to explicate the meaning
of Peircean habit and demonstrate its value for education.

Others

have had the intention of explaining the meaning of these key Peircean
concepts, key, that is, to the nature of habit,
I have chosen ten terms.
Peircean system.
chapter.

These terms are part of the whole

All of these terms will be included within my third

They are terms, if one speaks metaphorically, woven within

the fabric of habit.

They are part of the interlacing threads, in-

troducing details which are connected to the whole called habit.

7
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Before I present this basic lexicon for Peircean habit, allow
me to illustrate briefly why I have selected these terms:

Peirce does

employ "categories" in a traditional sense; yet he places all within
his categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.

It is es-

sential to be aware of, if not totally understand, Peirce's categories
before one approaches a thorough study of habit.

Furthermore, when

one views Peircean habit, he views a world of evolution consisting
in the lessening of "chance," of paradoxical "freedom," and of habit
related "conduct, law, perception and thinking."

The "future,"

the process of "inquiry" and "induction" are defined in a manner
unique to Peirce; and, like the other terms, they are integral to an
understanding of habit.
Lest I appear a dunce in the modern rather than the Renaissance
sense of the word, I will allow Peircean experts to comment on the
meaning of:

categories, chance, conduct, freedom, the future, inquiry,

law, induction, perception, and thinking.

These concepts will be pre-

sented in lexical fashion:
The Categories:

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness

My view is that there are modes of being. I hold that we can
directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time
before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive
quality, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that
will govern facts in the future.
The first category comprises the qualities of phenomena, such
as red, bitter, tedious, hard, heartening, noble ....
The second category of elements comprises the actual facts.
The qualities in so far as they are general ..•.

9

The third category of elements of phenomena consists of what
we call laws when we contemplate them from the outside only.
(1. 301-2) 1
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are Peirce's irreducible
categories, his threefold ontological classification which he subsequently referred to as It (the \vorld of the senses), Thou (the world
of the mind), and I (the world of the abstract).

These categories,

derived from Kantian doctrine, are related to habit.
places "habit" in the category of Thirdness.

In fact Peirce

Habits, laws, rules,

potentiality, concepts and meaning are Thirdness.
Firstness is qualitative and immediate.
tive nor objective.

It is neither subjec-

It is "unattached possibility" never encountered

by itself, always encountered in the concrete, in experience from
which it is inseparable.

Richard Bernstein noted that Firstness

should not be confused with actual experience.

It is similar to the

vague feeling which we, as men, claim to have sensed -- love.

Like

love, it is not subject to analysis.2

1All citations to Peirce's work will be notated in the traditional form. The citation numbers refer to: Charles Sanders Peirce,
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1-6, ed. C. Hartshore and P. Weis~ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935)
and vols. 7-8, ed. A. W. Burks, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958).
2Richard J. Bernstein, "Action, Conduct, and Self-Control," in
Perspectives on Peirce: Critical Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce, ed.
Richard J. Bernstein, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 71.
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Secondness, as Bernstein further demonstrates, is similar to the
relationship of a shoulder being pushed against a door.
is being made to exert effort.
not conduct.

The door resists,

The shoulder

This is action,

It is dual and oppugnant, a mutual struggle. 3

It is

hie et nunc.
Thirdness like habit (because it includes habit) is future oriented.
It is like law (cf.

"law" entry).

requires Thirdness.

To underscore:

there would be no Thirdness.

It requires Secondness as Secondness
if it were not for Secondness,

If it were not for brute action, there

would be no rules, laws, signs, or habits.4
Peirce's categories frame his entire work.
Peirce are too detailed to concern us here.

The categories of

It must, however, be

remembered that for Peirce the categories represent the three irreducible modes of being:

possibility, actuality, and law.5

It must also

be remembered that Peirce assigns habit to .the category of Thirdness,
the mode of being concerned with the future.
Chance:
I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of
generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has
produced all regularities,,. I attribute it altogether to
chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of spontaneity
which is to some degree regular. (6,63)

3 Ibid. pp. 71-72.
4Ibid, PP· 75-76.
5Cf. 1. 23
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Within the Peircean Universe, there is the prime element of
chance or spontaneity.

Chance, the mathematical Peircean term for

spontaneity, becomes an important part of the philosophical system
of Peirce.

"What Peirce is getting at is there is no snch thing as

purely mechanical movement.

All movement requires some degree of

• ....116
spontane1ty

Conduct:
Although the word "conduct" itself is not of unusual import in
Peircean literature, it is of value and should be listed in this
ruuimentary lexicon.

Conduct as Bernstein concluded is what Peirce

calls "would be's."7

It is tied by Peirce to the future and to the

idea of control.

Of equal importance, a "deliberate, or self-controlled

habit is precisely a belief."

(5. 480)

"Conduct, as distinguished from brute action, is essentially
general.
ity."8

While brute action is singular, conduct is a type of activPeirce, as Vincent Potter summarized, puts forth conduct as

something which does not come from the innate or intuitive disposition
of man.

Rather Peircean man "makes •.. (an) intention articulate and

explicit by formulating rules of conduct,"9

Conduct is based on facts

known. 10

6vincent G. Potter, S.J., Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals,
(Amherst: The University of Massachusett~ Press, 1967),~13~
?Bernstein, Perspectives, p. 75.
Brbid. p. 77.
9Potter, On Norms, p. 21,
lOcf. 5.460
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Freedom:
Vincent Potter waxes both poetic and paradoxical when he writes
of freedom as he sees it in the writings of Peirce:
Human purposes are both normative and capable of modification by
critical review, Human purpose, the archetype of final causes,
involves habit acquired or modified by reflection on experience.
It is this capacity for critical review and control of actions
which defines man as a rational animal and therefore while it
supposes freedom on man's part, freedom of choice, man is not
free to accept or reject his nature and its freedom.ll
A man has no choice but to be rational and thus to become more
reasonable.
Future:
And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says
nothing of single experiments or of single experimental phenomena (for what is conditionally true in futuro can hardly be
singular), but only speaks of general~inds of experimental
phenomena. (5.459)
lVhether Peirce is writing Latin or English, he is concerned about
the future.

Peirce takes the future more immediately than most, for

the future as Gary Shapiro states "is real, i.e. it must be recognized
in the final account of things as independent of the thought of any
particular person or group."12
It should be noted that habit is future oriented.

llPotter, On Norms, p. 127; the reader may also find of interest
Wells' essay "TheFree Nature of Peirce's Evolutionism," in Studies In
The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. P. P. Wiener and F. H.
Young, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952). Wells investigates the fundamentally problematic nature of freedom.
12Gary Michael Shapiro, "Peirce's Theory of Habit" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971), p. 96
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Induction:
John H. Lenz explicates Peirce's claim that "induction is self
corrective."l3

Finding Peirce too unclear, he, however, makes no de-

finitive statement.

The argument is long but does highlight many

matters which the true amateur of Peircean induction may want to see
highlighted.

David Savan considers the complexities in Peircean as-

-

sertions about induction in the well argued essay "Peirce's Infallibilism."l4

Arthur W. Burks theorizes about Peircean induction and

probability in "Peirce's Two Theories of Probability."l5

The nature

of Peircean induction is perhaps best summarized by Victor Lenzen i.n
an essay entitled "Charles S. Peirce as Astronomer."
.•• for all our knowledge is derived from induction, and its
analogue, hypothesis. Peirce states that the general nature
of induction is everywhere the same and is completely typified
by the following example. From a bag of black and white beans
I take out a handful, and I assume that the black and white are
nearly in the same ratio throughout the bag. If the experimenter
is in error in this conclusion, it is an error which a repetition
of the same process must tend to rectify. It is, therefore, a
valid inference. But it clearly teaches nothing in reference
to the color of any particular bean. Only the approximate general ratio can be inferred and this is represented by the probability for black or white beans. Given a large number of bags
in each of which we know the relative number of black beans,
then if the black beans have a value and the white beans none,
the man who knew the relative number of black beans in every bag
would act as though the bean he would draw from the bag which
contained the larger proportion of black ones were known to be

13John W. Lenz, "Induction as Self-Corrective," in Studies In The
Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Edward C. Moore and Richard
S. Robin, (Amherst: The University of Hassachusetts Press, 1964),
pp. 15l2;162
David Savan, "Peirce's Infallibilism," in Studies, pp. 190-211.
15 studies, pp. 141-150.

Philosophy~
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black, and as though the bean he would draw from the other would
be certainly white. For knowledge derives its practical importance from its influence upon our conduct.l6
Inquiry:
Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of op~n~on ...
That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a
very important proposition .... (5.375)
The above quotations are from the "Fixation of Belief," an 1877
essay in which Peirce makes valued claims for habit and its relationship to belief.

In 1899, Peirce considered the way of inquiry so im-

portant that he suggested, "Do not block the way of inquiry" (1.135)
should be grafted on every wall of philosophy.

In the 1877 article

which Peirce published in Popular Science Monthly, he noted that one
of the facts with which logic begins is:

"That belief gradually tends

to fix itself under the influence of inquiry .•.. " (3.670)
Richard Robin takes the disparate threads entangling inquiry
and sorts them out:

"Since inquiry is defined in terms of the struggle

caused by the irritation of doubt to attain a state of belief, the
end of inquiry becomes the fixation of belief ... truth is that at
• .... nl7
.
.
whi c h 1nqu1ry
a1ms
Peirce, trusting in science, equates rational inquiry with scientific inquiry.

Truth, for Peirce, is belief compelled by scientific

inquiry.

16studies, pp. 41-42.
17Richard Robin, "Peirce's Doctrine of the Normative Sciences,"
in Studies, pp. 273-274.
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Law
Peirce uses law in a less rigid sense than most scientists
would.

Law should not be confused with "law-statement."

For Peirce,

the law of reason is the basis for regularities or habits.
subject to both modification and growth.

It is

It demands not exact con-

formity; it does not freeze further modifications of habit.
law of mind makes a given feeling more likely to rise."

"The

(6.23)

Law, for Peirce, involves spontaneity or chance; it involves the
future and, of course, habit.

Law for Peirce is a generalizing

tendency; it is the cause of action and "self generative."
Rollin Workman, in an essay entitled "Pragmatism and Realism"
makes a clear distinction between two senses of the word "law."
••. A Law is in the first place a real active thing (5.107,
1.542). It is active in the way habit is active. In fact a
habit is simply a law as the latter appears in human beings
(2.148). In the second sense, a law is a verbal statement
of a law in the first meaning. The description of a habit is
also a law in sense two.l8
Perception:
Richard J. Bernstein warns in "Peirce's Theory of Perception."
"When approaching Peirce, one cannot help feeling a bit apprehensive
about presenting a coherent account of his views on perception ... " 19
Bernstein, at length, considers perception in terms of Peirce's philosophie dialectic and concludes:

18Rollin Workman, "Pragmatism and Realism," Studies, p. 244.
l9studies, p. 165.
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Perception, for Peirce, is the means by which we come into contact with a richly textured qualitative world which is far more
extensive than the narrow boundaries set by both empiricists
and rationalists as well as by contemporary analysts. Through
perception we are aware of a world which forces itself upon us.
Perception is both the starting point and testing ground for
our most imaginative speculations. Perception as judgment is
logically continuous with the self-controlled judgments that
are characteristic of the higher reaches of rationality. Perception, nevertheless, stands at the threshold of all inquiry
controllable and eminently fallible. Perception conditions all
thought and is the basis for the rational control of action.
~The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at
the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both
those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. 20
Thinking:
Vincent Potter notes as J. Boler did in Charles Peirce and
Scholastic Realism:
Of course pragmaticism recognizes a connection between thought
and action. Ultimately it makes thought apply to action, and
indeed it is thought which distinguishes conduct from mere
activity. Yet this is quite different from saying either that
thought consists in action or that thought's ultimate Eurpose
· is action.21
Potter concludes the above summary with Peirce's words:
••• As for the ultimate purpose of thought, which must be the
purpose of everything, it is beyond human comprehension; but
according to the stage or approach my thought has made of it ...
it is by the indefinite replication of self-control upon selfcontrol that the vir is begotten, and by action, through thought,
he grows an esthetic ideal .•. as the share which God permits him
to have in the work of creation. (5.403)

20 rbid. p. 184; cf. also 5.22.
21Potter, On Norms, p. 66.
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The "ground clearing" is accomplished.
an understanding of habit, have been examined.
become evident in the following chapter.

The terms, necessary to
Their importance •..rill

CHAPTER III
HABIT
Habit, for Charles Sanders Peirce, is basic,
and reconsidered the ontological status of habit.

Peirce considered
To understand how

Peirce could make habit of such fundamental importance, one must view
habit in its various stages within Peircean literature:

from habit

associated with habitualiter to habit specified as belief.
Peirce clarified, by degrees, the difference between habitual
presence and habit as belief.

What is of particular importance in a

consideration of the educational value of Peircean habit is that all
beliefs, for Peirce, are habits and all habits, however, are not
beliefs.

In fact, it is within the consideration of "belief-habit"

that.Peirce becomes the most lucid, the most coherent.

"Belief-habit"

is the keystone supporting the more encompassing notion of habit.
Peirce's development of "belief-habit" is not linear, thus it must
be examined at various times in a variety of contexts.
These examinations are essential to an understanding of "beliefhabit."

I will examine habit and capability, habit and the tendency

to take habits, and habit as distinguished from the habitual.

I will

also note the logical context into which Peirce placed habit.

I shall

then examine, via illustration, Peircean man believing, controlling,
and doubting.

I shall further examine two important corollaries which

18
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Peirce drew from his consideration of "belief-habit."

From Peirce's

definitions of belief and habit, will emerge man, a cluster of habits.
HABIT AND CAPABILITY
In the mode of Duns Scotus, Peirce postulated that a notion could
exist in the mind habitualiter, i.e. when it can but does not necessarily produce a conception.!

Peirce is considering a type of abstract

knowledge, which although capable, is not realized in consciousness,
i.e. does not reach intellectual fruition.
knowledge is present in some sense.

This type of abstract

For example:

John, a high school

student, may know various rules governing the use of the gerund, its
relationship to a noun, and its verbal limitations.

Yet, John may

never call to mind this knowledge when he writes "Biking is good exercise."

This type of knowledge is an example of the habitualiter notion.

For to know the function and the use of the gerund admits to John a
capability.

It is a capability which John can but does not use; it is

a capability which does not produce.

Peirce is noting, through the

use of the word habitualiter, capability and its relation to habit.
Eventually, Peirce will argue that

~

person can have a belief as one

can have a concept which will not necessarily, at once, be put to use.
It could be used if the occasion arises.

The capability is there.

!Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 177.

20

The notion of capability will be developed in the consideration of
belief-habit.
Thus Peirce, the pragmatic philosopher, in the 1860's, is considering habit in terms of capability; simultaneously the mathematical
Peirce is considering that, within infinity, certain characters start
appearing with greater frequency than others, i.e. (to use a Peircean
phrase) there is "a tendency to take habits."

2

HABIT AND THE TENDENCY TO TAKE HABITS
"To take" is not as innocent as it appears.
sideration.

It is worthy of con-

The idea of "taking" connotes garbing, clothing, and,

often, changing of outward appearance.
habit in medias res.

Peirce begins his argument on

For the word "habit" and the idea of "taking"

gives the student the impression of arming one's self for the occasion.
Peirce connects the two:

"habit" and "taking;" but he does not explain

the .tone, the ideas which he associates with "habit."

He uses "habit"

on account of what he associates with the word; it is not immediately
clear for the student of Peirce what these associations are.

It is

only in Peirce's later works when we begin to understand the linking
of "habit," "taking," and belief that we begin to understand what
Peirce associates with habit.
HABIT AND ITS LOGICAL CONTEXT
Within the Peircean consideration of habit and the habitual, a
further clarification developed.

In "Some Consequences of Four In-

capacities," Peirce underscored the formation of habit as an induction:

2cf. 6.21 and 6.22

21
Attention produces effects upon the nervous system. These effects
are habits ... A habit arises when, having had the sensation of
performing a certain act, m, on several occasions a, b, c, we
come to do it upon every occurence of the general ~ve;t,-~, of
which~· ~. ~ are special cases.
Thus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore
necessarily connected with attention and abstraction. Voluntary
actions result from the sensations produced by habit, as instructive actions result from our original nature. (5.297)
Thus a habit results from a case or stimulus or occasion presentiqg itself.

A result has occurred.

"a belief of a rule."

A rule is followed, more precisely

For Peirce, every belief is a rule.3

Every

belief is a rule in the sense that a person is disposed to act, prepared
to act if the occasion arises.

In fact, the person is prepared even if

the occasion does not arise.
The always logical Peirce uses induction as his logical formula
to express the forming of a habit.

If one links induction to the

earlier idea of capability, one can see that habit is more than an
innate disposition.

It is an induction tied to a "general event."

When a habit is operative, a result may come about.

That is, when

certain events occur, Peirce argues a habit may become operative.
Conditions present themselves.

Man notes the particular facts and is

attentive since he has seen similar conditions.
the thought from the circumstance.
repeatedly before.

He then separates

He may have noted the conditions

His attention and abstraction are voluntary for he

is dealing with signs of which he is and has been aware.

3 Cf. 2.643.

He then
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draws a conclusion based upon the past (previous manifestations of
these conditions).

Then he may act.

The action which results from

this Peircean "welding of sensation" is also voluntary; it is action
which results from perception.

This type of action should not be

confused with action which is instinctive, i.e. action resulting from
man's original nature. 4
PEIRCEAN MAN
Peirce saw man's innate or natural disposition, by degrees,
becoming a structure informed or given character and, still gradually,
becoming more developed, less chaotic because man's disposition acquired,
via experience and perception, habits.s

Peirce (like Wordsworth:

"the

eye it cannot choose but see") considered perception6 to lack control.
How can man control then what he perceives?

Peircean man, we shall see,

controls by way of habit and its inferential nature.
One illustration may serve to make perception and inferential
activity and their connection to habit clear:
down an unknown street.

Mr. Santiago is driving

Seeing a "stop sign," he stops because his

attention was drawn to an essentially "general event," not a particular
sign.

He stopped not on account of intuition but because he had the

habit of stopping at stop signs, because he had abstracted "stop" from
the red octagon, and because he applied the rule "stop at stop signs"
to this particular attention-drawing sign.

4c£. 6. 228.
Scf. 5.504; 5.5115; 1.647.
6 cf. Chapter two: "Perception"

He stopped here and now.
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The act of stopping is an individual act; but it is related to Mr.
Santiago's past experience.
"habit" for the future.

The action is a further securing of the

Mr. Santiago believes in this habit.

Since

he believes, he knows that by taking his foot off the gas and braking
he can achieve the desired result.

Believing guides or molds his action.

Mr. Santiago is satisfied for, as Peirce would append, Mr. Santiago is
certai_11.
What would happen if a sign said "stop" but it did not resemble
the usual red octagon?

Should Mr. Santiago stop?

The "if" information

is different; Mr. Santiago cannot follow his usual sequence.

It is not

that Santiago disbelieves; no, rather he is in a state of uncertainty
about the future.

His habit, which is future oriented, has faltered.

He must reshape his habit.

He must now exercise control for there is

a problem in his guiding principle.
Control, for Peirce, is the power to reason, the power to place
ideals or purposes under a microscope of critical review.7
of reasoning is to find out what we do not know.

The object

In order to find out

what we do not know, we must begin with knowledge already acquired
which we believe to be true and valid, knowledge which can inferentially
guide us.

7cf. Chapter two:

"Conduct"
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That \vhich determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference rather than another, is some habit of mind, whether it be
constitutional or acquired. The habit is good ... according as it
produces true conclusions ..• and an inference is valid ••• according
as the habit which determines it is such to produce true conclusions. The particular habit of mind which governs this or
that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth
depends on the validity of the inference which the habit determines; and such a formula is called the guiding principle of inference.B
With perception and control delineated, habit and belief can be

-

outlined.

Peirce, interestingly, approached belief both positively

and negatively.

Negatively, he considered "doubt," the foil of belief.

Returning to the previous example may help to illustrate both belief
and doubt.
Mr. Santiago had a belief, a habit of which he was conscious.9
If he actually called this belief to mind and it, in a logical sense,
held true, this would be a good judgment.
What our hypothetical Mr. Santiago did, when he came to the nonred octagon stop sign, was compare pertinent past experiences to the
present stimulus, i.e. the non-red sign.
activity was erratic.

He then reconsidered.

His

His reconsidering, however, may lead to the form-

ing of a new resolve which will become a new habit.

The erratic ac-

tivity and old habit will be superseded by a new habit.lO
he will stop at all signs lettered "stop."

Perhaps,

The individual stimulus,

8rn 5.367 and 2.711 Peirce uses habit to refer to both acquired
and congenital habits; but, as Vincent Potter points out (On Norms, p.
126) Peirce (Cf. 5.531) is really speaking of acquired habits.
9cf. 4.53
lOcf. 5.417
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the non-red stop sign has become part of the cluster of thoughts.
This new resolve is consequent to previous resolves as one thought
is consequent to a previous thought.
habit.

This new resolve is a belief

A belief is always a habit; and thus belief should be re-

ferred to as "belief-habit." 1 1
Belief-habit is a dialogue among the past, the present, and the
future. 12

A belief may be completed only for a moment.

The dialogue

may, as in the case of Mr. Santiago, be interrupted by doubt:
A true doubt of such a belief must interfere with this natural
mode of acting •.• these new habits must not be regarded as expressions of the natural belief simply; for they inevitably
involve something more. Consequently, if subsequent reflection
results in doubt of them, it is not necessarily doubt of the
original belief, although it may be mistaken for such a
doubt.
(5.76)
Whether it is a doubt of the original belief or not, doubt
creates an uneasy dissatisfaction; it thus causes a different sensation than believing causes.
action.

Doubting does not guide man or mold

Rather, man is forced, because he doubts, to free himself

from this annoying feeling of dissatisfaction; man is forced, because
he doubts, to seek satisfaction and calm; man is forced to believe.
Doubt is appeased; habit is established.
Simply stated:

doubt will stimulate man to struggle for

belief; and belief places man in a condition from which he is

llcf. Chapter two:
12cf. Chapter two:

Thinking
Future
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capable of reacting in a certain way if the occasion arises.
the occasion to struggle to attain belief is doubt.
belief is the removal of doubt.

Thus

The motive for

Satisfaction comes to the believer;

for his belief settles the immediate doubt, establishes a temporary
terminus for opinion, ends inquiry, and enables the dialogue among
the past, present, and future to continue.
-Mr. Santiago's "belief-habit" was obstructed, he doubted.

The

conditions being different from those which he usually perceived
destroyed his certainty.

His habit gave way to uncertainty.

In a

more serious case, uncertainty often gives birth to apprehension,
qualms, and anxiety.

Man (Mr. Santiago is typical of the species),

thus, is motivated to seek a new habit which will not be blocked,
a belief with "practical consequences" which are expected to alleviate disappointment.
It is Peirce's view that every problem (struggle to believe/
inquiry) 13 is stimulated by doubt and ended with a new belief--a
conscious, deliberate habit of action.
Peirce draws two corollaries from his consideration of "habit
of action":

(1)

Belief is a rule of action.14

(2)

Two apparently

different beliefs, having the same practical consequences, have the
same meaning.

Within this second proposition lies the Pragmatic

criterion of meaning.

In Peircean terms, it is related thus:

13 cf. Chapter two: "Inquiry"
14I would like to direct the reader's attention to Baldwin's
Dictionary of Philosophy. T~vo articles, one on "Rule" and one on
"Laws of Thought", are initialed "C.S.P." I would further suggest
that the use of "rule" suggests an approved procedure, approved
that is by the actor.

27
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception,
one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and
the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning
of the conception. (5.9)
Belief, falling under the category of Thirdness,l5 is a rule of
action.

Action, stemming from thought,l6 involves consequences; in

fact, a belief-habit is the very purpose which Peirce attributes to
thought.

In Peircean terms, when a person states that he understands

-·
the meaning of a thing, he really is saying that he understands not

the thought behind an action but rather the very action brought about.
This action is the result of action; more specifically, it is the
result of the sum of the belief-habits involved.
It must be noted that action is the result of the habits involved
and the correct circumstances.
continuum with other habits.

In Peircean terms, a habit is on a
An individual habit can only be iden-

tified by "how" it might lead someone to act "when" certain circumstances prevail.

The identity of a habit depends on both the stimulus

received by way of perception and the eventuating sensible results. 17
The second corollary involves the meaning of a habit; that meaning is associated with actual results.

l5cf. Chapter two: "Categories"
16cf. 6.20 and Chapter two: "Thinking"
17 cL s.4oo

28
It should be noted that two people may have the same habit; and
this fact (that they have the same habit) can be judged by an observation of the practical consequences.
Allow me to illustrate with a non-belief habit:
shooting baskets from different points in a court.
different.
their shgts.

Age is different.

Size is different.

two boys are

Gravitation is
Both boys make all

The same practical consequences occur.

Their clusters

of training, adroitness, and experience produce results with the same
meaning.
So too, what the result of a habit will be depends partly on
what other habits the subject has and partly on the ability of one
habit to modify another.

To illustrate this Peirce uses the effect

of gravitation on two different subjects.

Gravitation is a non-

belief habit that has a different result when it is applied to a
billiard ball being dropped from a high building than when it is
applied to a parachutist jumping from a plane.

Both the billiard

ball and the parachutist are clusters of non-belief habits.

The

results are different.
Consider man to be a cluster of habits.
man is different.

The cluster for each

Another habit is added to the cluster.

This habit,

like all habits, is similar to a line drawn on a blackboard.

The

line gets its continuity, its coherence, its detailing from the blackboard itself as the habit gets its immediate connection to a subject
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and its meaning because a structure already exists, a structure of
other habits which have similar but not equal staying power.l8
Peirce has defined "belief-habit" slowly.
which becomes clear by degrees.

It is a definition

Capability, habit-taking, and in-

duction are associated with habit, but habit becomes most lucid when
specified as a belief.
To sum up thus far:
a

~elief,

Peircean man thinks in order to establish

a rule of action, a habit of the mind.

something of which man is conscious.
thought rests.

A belief-habit contents doubt;

This belief-habit influences other thinking.

applies this belief, further doubt may come about.
follows further doubt.
an ideal.
of conduct.

A belief-habit is

If one

Further thinking

Peircean man will continue to reflect upon

Intending to act, he will continue to formulate rules
Holding a concept, his mind constantly encounters

· matteF and evolves.

His thought grows when he forms new habits,

discards old habits, or allows one habit to influence another.
Peircean man becomes more uniform; he is less deformed by spontaneity
when he continues to establish rules of conduct, habits of thought.
Habits are general; action, however, is singular.

The habit

effects a certain disposition which is affected by other habits;
the habit, with other habits, becomes part of the pragmatic man's
"muscles."

18

The desired ideal, by way of reflection, becomes a

Cf. 6. 228
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potentiality and thus a calculus for prediction.
becomes a foundation for the "will be."

The "would be"

The ideal becomes a habit,

a law of conduct.l9
Habit, developed, modified, and corrected, by both experience
and reflection is simply a law.

It is not a law of exact conformity.20

It is a conditional law having requirements or stipulations.
these eonditions the action may follow.
response in exact accordance.
negates man's freedom.

Given

Physical laws demand a

Exact compliance, Peirce would argue,

Man, in a Peircean paradox, is not free to

reject his freedom, not free to be irrational.21Man, using his
reasons, is not free to be irrational.
is not only sapient but liberated.

With reason the Peircean man

Man, compelled to make life more

reasonable, of necessity will review critically all habits acquired
and modified.

Not governed by absolute belief-habit, man may,

through force of habit, hold fast to a rule of conduct proven to be
an impediment to truth.

Nevertheless, (thank Zeus for Peircean op-

timism!) this same man will through force of reason give up the
habit.

Peircean man can modify a habit by experience or by will .
..• every man exercises more or less control over himself by
means of modifying his own habits; and the way in which he
goes to work to bring this effect about in those cases in
which circumstances will not permit him to practice reiterations of the desired kind of conduct in the outer world •..

19 cf. Chapter two:
20cf. 6. 23
2lcf. Chapter two:

"Law"
"Freedom"
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fancied reiterations, if well intensified by direct effort,
produce habits; and these habits will have power!£ influence
actual behavior in the outer world ... (5.487)
Habits will have the power, the capability, to influence behavior in the world outside the mind.
about a certain situation:

Peircean man can woolgather

he can prepare to save the life of his

burning sister, to accept an award for heroism beyond the call of
duty, to talk back to his boss, or to reprimand a naughty child.
The situations may arise again and again in his mind.

Each time

he practices, in the world of the imagination, the action for the
situation.
Peircean man is a citizen of a "double world;" the outer
world and the world of fancy or the imagination.

The degree to

which a man can be affected by the world of fancy depends on his
innate disposition and his other habits.
Of notable importance is that the man, who chooses to exercise
control, can work to bring about in his mind a habit which circumstances in the outer world do not allow.

This habit can influence

other habits; but this habit comes under the Peircean law of habit.
Uniformities in the modes of action of things have come about
by their taking habits. At present, the course of events is
approximately determined by law. In the past that approximation was less perfect; in the future it will become more
and more perfect. The tendency to obey laws has always
been and will be growing. (1.409)
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Peirce, ever the mathematician, viewed the world as consisting
in uniformities, potentialities, regularities, and habits:

These

habits, subject to modification, may establish ne\v better habits or
potentialiti~s.

Belief-habits, also subject to modification, may

also establish better belief-habits bridging "the chasm between the
chance medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law."

(6.262)

{)ne can infer the actual behavior of men from their "potentialities."

There is, however, a necessary admonition:

this in-

ference can be made with degrees of, not complete, certainty for
Peirce is concerned with probability and the long run.

To say that

a man has a habit is to state that he will "probably" react in one
way because he has already reacted in this way.

Action always con-

tains "a certain amount of spontaneity;" and habits are "gentle
forces" making a certain action more likely.
The essence of the Peircean man is his behavior, his observed
habits.

Behavior is the sum of the habits involved.

a man is by viewing what he does.
vital, alive with action.

We know what

Definitions, for Peirce, are

They consist in descriptions of what

habits are calculated to produce.

"Ye shall know them by their

fruits."
In Peirce's cosmos, the tendency to form habits grows through
itself.

The degree of conformity of habit to law increases with
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the exercise of habit.
tending to order.
To conclude:

Peirce's universe is one of chaotic chance

His man is a child of chance evolving to uniformity.
belief-habit is an intelligently acquired habit.

Habit is prime for the Peircean man.

Habit is

a law or conditional

relating antecedent conditions to consequent experience.

Habit

allows man to criticize his activity and the activity of others.
Habit is the essence of belief.
different modes of action.

Different beliefs will establish

Habit is at the very core of man's

aqility to control his activity.

To Peirce, control and the ten-

dency to take habits are synonyomous.
the capacity for control.

To reason is to demonstrate

Reasoning begins with a truth, or rather

the recognition of something as true22 and proceeds to a new truth.
Reasoning, deliberate and controlled, supposes freedom and yet forces
man, who sees the more reasonable course, to acquire various habits.
The establishment of habit is the essence of belief.23

Beliefs are

distinguished pragmatically by the actions to which they give rise,
by their sensible effects.
It is Peirce's deliberation on habit which led to his pragmatic
maxim:

22 cf. 4.476
23 cf. 5. 39
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Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (5.402)
It is also habit which is at the nucleus of the Peircean theory
of the universe.
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
becoming physical laws. (6.25)

·-.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In my concluding chapter, I do not intend to argue the rightness of Peirce's evaluation of habit.

I do not intend to base a

curriculum or even a syllabus upon Peircean habit.

Rather, I

intend to suggest that Charles Sanders Peirce's work is worthy of
consideration in the educational field and that "habit" is a good
focal point at which educators could begin that consideration.
As I noted in Chapter One, Peirce left a wealth of coded
brilliance; but his work was hardly systematic.

Since Peirce did

not present a clear system, many students of Peirce have imposed
an order upon his works.
works is often arbitrary.
a Procrustean manner.

Unfortunately, the ordering of Peirce's
In fact, the works are often treated in

Head and legs, if one will excuse the

gory metaphor, are stretched or chopped to make Peirce's work fit
theory.

Peirce, however, lies uncomfortably in another's theory.

In the field of education, two dissertations, Elvira Tarr's
"The Epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce and Its Relation To
Education" and George S. Macc:;ia's "The Epistemology of Charles S.
Peirce and Its Implications For A Philosophy of Education" demonstrate the educational value of Peirce's works, provide seminal
material for further discussion and debate, and underscore the
difficulty of ordering Peirce's works.

I will limit my remarks on

the dissertations to brief summaries and comments pertinent to
habit.

Having discussed the

t>-JO

35

dissertations, I will then provide
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an illustration of an educator considering a student's problem in
terms of Peircean habit.
I

George Maccia's dissertation is worthy of praise.

Without

his audacious attempt Ms. Tarr's work and my own would probably
have met with less success.

In 1952, Maccia attempted to systematize

educationally The Collected Papers and to compare their content to
John Dewey's Democracy and Education.

In Maccia's own words, the

purpose of this study was to answer the following questions:
What is the relation between the knower and the known?
What is the relation between knowing and truth?
What is the relation between knowing and the good?
What are the aims of education as derived from Peirce's
epistemology?
What are the aims of education as stated by John Dewey in
Democracy and Education?
How do these aims of education as derived from Peirce compare
with those stated by Dewey?
Who should control the curriculum?
What should be the organization of the curriculum?!
Directing his dissertation towards both students of philosophy
and students of education, Maccia failed to serve Peirce well.
Attempting too much, Maccia was also asking rhetorically whether
the attacks against modern education would be valid and effective
if they were leveled against Peirce's philosophy of pragmaticism.
In the world of the hypothetical, Maccia's questions were meritoriously
profitable.

As I noted, however, the scope was too large; and the

1 George S. Maccia, "The Epistemology of Charles S. Peirce And
Its Implications For A Philosophy of Education" (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Southern California, 1952), p.4.
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limitations were arbitrary and without needed defense.

For example

it is difficult to understand the validity of the following premise:
The study of the aims of education of John Dewey will be
limited to those found in his book entitled Democracy
and Education. This writing of Dewey is widely used as a
text in colleges of education and departments of education
in universities throughout the country. Therefore, it is
assumed that aims of education expressed in this volume
would be reflected in educational teaching and practice
which follow the teachings of John Dewey.2
Can John Dewey justly be limited to Democracy and Education
and then compared to the whole published opus of Peirce?
Nonetheless, my main criticism of Maccia concerns habit.
specifically, Maccia depended on Peirce for consistency.

More

At one

point, Peirce may have insisted that one can develop habits only
through experience; but, at another time, Peirce may state that
important habits can be developed in the imagination.

Imagination

for Peirce plays a larger role than Maccia realized when he stated
"Since the student can only learn through experience, he must
experience conduct which is commensurate with the ethical aim." 3
The vagaries of the imagination do not necessarily have to be tested
in experience as Maccia suggested.

The world of imagination can

be conducive to habit formation and learning.
Additionally, since Peirce often uses a word in both a technical
sense and common sense, it seems of value for Maccia to have mentioned

2Ibid. p. 16.
3rbid. p. 177.
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this.

Ill defined, habit in Maccia's thesis omitted important deno-

tations.

Without a stipulative definition or an illustrative example,

much became argued that was beyond the consideration of Peirce:
Habit and belief are closely allied; therefore, the distinction
between the two must be clarified. A habit is a tendency to
behave in a similar way under similar future circumstances.
Habit is not an affection of consciousness. It is a general
law of action. As a law, habit is a rule that determines
that on a certain general kind of occasion man will act in a
~ertain general kind of way. Belief is a habit.4
Not only does the above quotation fail to clarify habit or
belief but it also leaves the reader in need of what both Maccia
and I felt was an important distinction.

Habit and belief are of

more than passing importance, and Maccia's failure to clarify impeded
my appreciation of his work.
Maccia has attempted too much:

an encomium on Peircean aims,

a derived Peircean epistemology, a comparison of Dewey to Peirce,
and a proposed Peircean curricular solution to modern educational
problems.
II
Unfortunately, Elvira Tarr's work views Peirce through a glass
even more darkly than Maccia's work.

Tarr's The Epistemology of Charles

Sanders Peirce and Its Relation to Education provides an introduction,
based on The Collected Papers, to Peirce's epistemology, his social
philosophy, and their relation to education.
pressive but not totally satisfying.

4 Ibid. p. 65.

Tarr's work is im-
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If one reads the rather brief"summary" sections that serve as
hardly more than textual glosses providing a running commentary,
one understands Ms. Tarr's problem.

Transitions from one idea to

another were accomplished with great difficulty,for all of Peirce's
work comprised his epistemology.
It should have.

The dissertation ranged too widely.

For to analyze The Collected Papers would demand

volumes of massive length and herculean effort.
Tarr's work, however, was impressive.
describe

It did identify and

the Peircean limits of knowledge, the origin of philosophic

doubt, the tradition in which he worked, his philosophic predecessors,
and Peirce's importance to philosophy.
I found of particular interest Ms. Tarr's discussion of both
conduct and experience.

Her comments on both the teaching and

learning of philosophy were significant and well worth re-examination •
• Ms. Tarr's main concern, however, was with formulating the
epistemology of Peirce from his published papers and with developing
proposals for education based on these principles.
Without attempting to make Peirce's work coherent, Tarr examined
what she considered major areas:

Peirce's criticism of Kant and

Descartes, his ontology, his concept of perception, his categories,
his phenomenology, and his ideas concerning community, conformity,
evolution, and control.

Finally, Ms. Tarr suggested a curriculum based

on her analysis of Peirce's work.

Tarr's Peircean curriculum, above

all, stressed inquiry and omitted the importance of habit.
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Ms. Tarr dismissed "habit" early in her study:
Peirce uses the word 'instinct' in a rather broad sense.
He builds on the idea of habit, which is a disposition,
that is, a "general principle working in a man's nature
to determine how he will act"; he further views an instinct
as an inherited disposition. Because it is so difficult to
be certain whether a habit is inherited or due to infantile
training, Peirce uses the word 'instinct' to cover both
cases (2.170). 5
Having dismissed habit because Peirce at one time favored
instinct, Tarr failed to note the countless occasions that habit
was precisely the word Peirce chose.

Yet a mere three paragraphs

later Ms. Tarr herself, quoting and paraphrasing Peirce, used
"habit" but failed to examine or to define it.

In fact, habit

is linked neither to belief nor to inquiry in Ms. Tarr's analysis.
The use of habit is not a casual use; nor does every use of
habit fall neatly under the cover of instinct.
dismissed.

Habit is too easily

Its dismissal, I believe, leaves a noticeable lacuna

in Tarr's evaluation of Peirce's epistemology.
Tarr unfortunately also uses inquiry, the .struggle for belief,
in both technical and common senses.

This misuse often confuses

the reader and, in fact, quite frankly perplexed me,for Ms. Tarr
must have realized that there is a marked difference between a
word which indicates a struggle to believe and a word which indicates
a seeking of information by questioning.

5Elvira Tarr, "The Epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce And
Its Relation to Education" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University,
1968); p. 95.
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Ms. Tarr, however, did make an important contribution to Peircean
literature.

Hers is a study of wide spectrum; yet it is in the width

of the study that the serious fault lies.

One hundred and seventy

pages simply cannot supply a complete epistemology for Charles S.
Peirce.

More to the point, habit, although mentioned, is never

considered as a major philosophical concept in Tarr's chapters on
epistemology, social philosophy, or education.
In both Tarr's and Maccia's works, width and seeming comprehensiveness circumscribe Peirce; his work is treated in such a
cursory manner that often the examination seemed desultory and
rambling.

A more protracted, exhaustive approach would have achieved

Ms. Tarr's desire to "stimulate educational practices and research."
III

Yet, as I believe is now obvious, habit is a term worth
ling~ring

over and contemplating.

It is one term with which a

gradual approach to Peirce could begin.
An awareness of Peircean habit could cause an educator to
reconsider, to evaluate, to amend, to rectify, or to leave alone
educational goals.

Habit is a concept to which a reasoning edu-

cator should respond.

It, I believe, is a concept capable of pro-

voking excitement and stirring the imagination.

Peircean habit

takes us far beyond "a settled disposition or tendency (esp. on
the part of the individual) leading one to do easily, naturally,
and with growing skill or certainty what one does often."6

It

6webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language:
Second Edition Unabridged.
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takes us beyond habit's synonyms carrying their own implications
and information.

Allow me to illustrate:

Solomon Broderick, having been raised on the West Side of
Chicago, attended a Chicago Public High School for three years.
Desiring to go to college but aware that his difficulties with
written English would prove a stumbling block, Solomon sought the
advice of his Senior English teacher.
Solomon's teacher, Mr. Armon, had encountered students like
Solomon before -- students who were from "another country,"
students who had not learned to get by, and students whose errors
in writing were not even predictable.
Armon felt that only a miracle, equivalent to the raising of
Lazarus, would help Solomon in writing.

Armon's expertise in

belletristic literature was not what Solomon needed.

Armon mused:

"Solomon is not ineducable; he writes as he spoke; drab, colloquial
jargon.

Solomon writes that way because that type of writing always

worked."
Upon closer analysis, Armon noted that Solomon's habitually
bad writing was the product of many influences.

Solomon, like

his friends, found pleasure in community argot.

He often imitated

the clipt, elliptical speech of his TV or movie heroes.
in class was a humiliating experience.

Speaking

Writing for school put

Solomon in a state of confusion; avoidance of the task became
commonplace.

Hours were spent putting off the assignment; excuses
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were made.

The only thing Solomon was sureofwas that the task

was impossible.

The more he had to write, the more strained he

felt, the more he became aware of the fact that he could no longer
communicate on paper what he really thought.

Perhaps, Armon con-

cluded, Solomon never could and never did communicate what he intended.
Let us now view Broderick through a Peircean scope.
Broderick is, on the positive side, less chaotic in his writing
than he was in his early grammar school years.

Believing that his

writing was adequate for the goal of getting by, Broderick molded
his action in accordance.

He continued to write as he had been

writing.
The future goal, however, for Broderick is different.

Solomon

Broderick feels that his writing will no longer be acceptable, i.e.
the babit of writing which worked in the past to a minimum degree
is failing him in the present and will fail him in the future.
To correct this habit, control must be exercised.

Solomon Broderick

must reshape his habit of writing.
The habit of writing is made up of many components:

punctua-

tion, grammar, mechanics, spelling usage, style, and documentation.
Some of those components are valid for Solomon.
example, may have a basic sentence sense.

Solomon, for

This basic sentence

sense could be the basis for writing effective prose.

Perhaps,

Armon could show Broderick how he weights his prose down with cliches,
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vague language, misplaced modifiers.

Broderick could be taught to

view his own work from the reader's perspective, taught to see that
words, phrases and punctuation are significant to people other than
teachers.
But first Broderick should understand the nature of his
doubt -- that he no longer believes that the idiosyncracies of
street_ vernacular, omissions and illogic work.
Can Peirce help?
previous use?

Does Peirce's concept of habit allow the

The question is sincere.

The answer is positive

but qualified.
Peirce would say that a new habit could be developed, that
the student should begin with what he has; he would further stress
the dialogue among the past, present, and future.

Of course, he

would note that this new habit would, if developed, become part
of a cluster of other habits.

All of these habits, Peirce would

add, modify one another.
In this theoretical example, the word "habit" would take on
implications far beyond the dictionary's definition and possibly
beyond the contextual meaning of any text on writing.

It could

lead to a new way of looking at the world as it did with Peirce.
Habit, which Peirce viewed as giving order to the universe,
ironically gives an ordered approach to Peirce's work.

Peirce's

work has been acknowledged by others as deserving investigation
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for its educational value.

My contribution has been to bring a

single concept, habit, into sharp focus, a point of concentration
from which educators may begin to study, to understand, or to
argue with Peirce.

I have removed all that was unnecessary to

"habit" in order to strengthen my presentation; I have, however,
been faithful to Peirce's work, a work which elucidates doubt,
~nquiry,

habits.

and belief and a work which views man as a cluster of
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